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Response to Amir Attaran
John W. McArthur, Jeffrey D. Sachs, Guido Schmidt-
Traub
Amir Attaran’s Policy Forum [1] raises important points on 
the poor quality of data for some indicators used to measure 
progress on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
but, sadly, uses these ﬁ  ndings to draw the wrong conclusions. 
The evidence he presents on a small number of indicators 
is partial, and does not justify his conclusion that the MDGs 
might become a liability and are doomed to fail. Quite the 
opposite is the case. 
Of course the data on the world’s extremely poor people 
are weak, as is just about every other aspect of efforts vis-a-vis 
the poor. The rich countries dramatically underinvest and 
make far too little effort in helping to save the poor from 
dying of malaria and tuberculosis (TB). It is, therefore, no 
surprise that developing countries and the international 
system lack the resources and operational support to measure 
malaria and TB well. Attaran’s criticisms in this regard are 
justiﬁ  ed and have been made by many others before him, 
including many professionals working for the United Nations 
(UN) system. 
The MDGs are a political commitment made by the 189 
countries represented at the 2000 Millennium Summit to 
halve extreme poverty in its many forms by 2015. The author 
ignores that such broad outcome goals adopted by world 
leaders are distinct from the technical question, how to 
deﬁ  ne and measure corresponding indicators, which the UN 
has been asked to help answer. It is, therefore, inaccurate 
to blame the UN system for setting goals that are difﬁ  cult 
to measure. Goal setting is the prerogative of world leaders, 
and they have correctly reafﬁ  rmed their commitment to the 
MDGs many times since 2000. 
In response, the UN system has set up an active process to 
review indicators and data on progress toward achieving the 
MDGs, involving many UN organizations as well as the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In recent years, 
this interagency process has already revised several MDG 
indicators and issued guidance notes on how data collection 
can be improved. The author’s assertion that the UN “shows 
a profound disrespect for the scientiﬁ  c process” [1] is wrong 
and misleading. The UN leadership rightly decided that 
the heads of state and government convening at the 2005 
World Summit should focus their attention on the high-level 
political decisions needed to strengthen the international 
framework for security, development, and human rights. On 
the development side, the greatest priority was to cement the 
MDGs as operational rather than simply rhetorical targets. 
The world leaders did not delve into the technical issues of 
measurement and indicators, but this important work will 
continue to be addressed by UN statisticians and independent 
experts. Such experts have indeed been scrutinizing the 
deﬁ  nition and measurement of these indicators for some 
time—as did, for example, several of the UN Millennium 
Project task forces. 
Another shortcoming of Attaran’s article is that it 
generalizes incorrectly across the MDGs. It describes some 
of the toughest measurement challenges (e.g., maternal 
mortality and malaria), and uses them to paint all the 
MDGs with the same brush. In addition to the example of 
child mortality rates cited in the article, several other MDG 
indicators can be measured quite well. These indicators 
include anthropometric measures of malnutrition, primary 
school enrollment, gender parity in education, and access to 
basic infrastructure services. 
An implication of Attaran’s argument is that there should 
be no goals when measurement is imperfect, as it is in many 
countries with indicators for maternal mortality. Should 
world leaders, therefore, not set time-bound goals for 
reducing maternal mortality? This would be wrongheaded 
for three clear reasons. First, even with incomplete or 
missing data, dramatic and veriﬁ  able improvements in 
women’s health can be achieved by investing in emergency 
obstetric care and other known, monitorable, and practical 
interventions to build and sustain primary health systems. 
The MDGs provide a major political and operational 
framework for doing this. Second, the MDGs are already 
promoting strengthened health systems in low-income 
settings, and those improved systems are key to ensuring 
the vital registrations that the author rightly recommends 
for improving the measurement of maternal mortality. 
Third, the very adoption of the maternal mortality goal 
(and others) is provoking greatly increased attention 
to improvements in data collection from the World 
Health Organization, the Gates Foundation, the World 
Bank, academia, and others. The MDGs should not be 
misunderstood as a static, one-off process. 
Attaran misleads the reader when he argues that the MDGs 
have become “all-encompassing” catch-alls for tenuously 
related interventions. To say that roads and electricity 
are falsely linked to achieving the MDGs is incorrect, and 
suggests a lack of understanding of the integrated nature of 
development processes. Roads and electricity play a critical 
role in poverty reduction, access to essential health services, 
reduction of maternal and child mortality, and a host of 
other channels directly related to success in achieving the 
MDGs. Therefore, any strategy to achieve the MDGs needs 
to include these interventions. The UN Millennium Project 
described these linkages in the most detailed series of studies 
on practical approaches to achieving the MDGs that has ever 
been produced. 
We hope that Attaran’s key message on improved data 
collection and interpretation is heard. More and better data 
are certainly needed on the conditions of the world’s poorest 
and most vulnerable people. However, even in countries with 
poor data systems, enough is known today to start making 
the practical and measurable investments in education, 
health, basic infrastructure, and improved environmental 
management that are vitally needed to cut, and eventually 
to end, extreme poverty. Crucially, the MDGs provide 
the unique framework for prompting the international 
cooperation that is indispensable to helping poor countries 
escape the poverty trap, and to benchmarking progress en 
route. No discussion about indicators and measurement—
no matter how justiﬁ  ed it is—should deﬂ  ect from the 
overarching global commitment to the poorest of the poor 
that world leaders struck at the Millennium Summit in 2000 
and reconﬁ  rmed at the World Summit in 2005.  
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Author’s Reply
I am grateful for the reply of Jeff Sachs, John McArthur, and 
Guido Schmidt-Traub to my article [1,2]. Their reply, written 
on behalf of the United Nations (UN) Millennium Project, 
shows that even the leading thinkers of that organization 
possess beliefs about the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) that contradict the factual evidence.  
On one issue, the UN Millennium Project team agrees with 
me: progress on the MDGs is sometimes not well measured, 
such that it is impossible to know if the goals are on track to 
being fulﬁ  lled by their 2015 deadline. 
But even on this issue, we disagree on the extent of the 
problem. The UN Millennium Project team writes that, 
because my analysis was limited to only the public health 
MDGs, I based my conclusions on only “the toughest 
measurement challenges,” and “generalize[d] incorrectly 
across the MDGs” [1]. In their view, if one leaves the difﬁ  cult 
health MDGs aside, then “several other MDG indicators can 
be measured quite well” [1].
To determine whether this assertion is correct, I accessed 
the UN’s own “Data Availability Analysis” [3] for 2005, which 
takes into account every one of the 48 UN-designated MDG 
indicators (really 65 indicators in 48 categories). For each 
indicator, the UN’s analysis summarizes the percentage of 
countries possessing measurements taken in two benchmark 
years: one year near the starting point of the MDGs (usually 
1990) and another year nearer to the present (after 1999). 
Naturally, it is the difference of this pair of benchmark 
measurements, taken years apart, which proves whether 
progress is or is not being achieved for a particular MDG 
indicator. 
The disappointing result of the UN’s “Data Availability 
Analysis” is that, more often than not, the requisite pair of 
benchmark measurements doesn’t exist, such that no factual 
conclusion about progress can be made. In the best case 
scenario, there are two indicators with paired benchmark 
measurements in 98% of countries. In the worst case scenario, 
there are 26 indicators—13 times as many—with paired 
benchmark measurements in none of the countries. Even 
the median MDG indicator, which is the one indicator most 
typical of the bunch, has paired benchmark measurements in 
just 5% of countries—meaning that the UN does not possess 
those data for 95% of countries.  
In that context, the UN Millennium Project team is 
deﬁ  nitely wrong to believe that, health indicators aside, 
the MDGs “can be measured quite well” [1]. The UN’s 
comprehensive analysis of all MDG indicators shows that, for 
whatever reason, most are not measured well, not even so 
rarely as twice a decade.
Why is measurement of the MDGs so generally poor? 
According to the UN Millennium Project team, the answer 
is money. They write that “developing countries and the 
international system,” which presumably includes the UN, 
“lack the resources to measure” the MDGs [1].
However, this belief, too, contradicts the evidence. 
Concerning the health MDGs, my article recommended 
expanding the network of demographic surveillance sites 
(DSS) as the single most efﬁ  cient way to obtain timely, 
accurate measurements [2]. According to a recent study of 
DSS in Tanzania, this costs $0.01 per person, per year [4]. 
Thus, to institute DSS and good quality MDG measurements 
for the 4 billion poorest people worldwide would cost perhaps 
$40 million annually. 
In this context, the UN Millennium Project team’s 
argument that the “international system lacks the resources” 
to effectively measure the health MDGs is without credibility. 
The sum of $40 million is under 0.1% of the global foreign 
aid budget (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development Development Assistance Committee [OECD 
DAC]).
Without such steps to measure progress on achieving the 
MDGs, any claims made for them are necessarily conjectural, 
rather than objective. The UN Millennium Project team 
writes that, even without measurement, “the MDGs are 
already promoting strengthened health systems in low-
income countries” [1]—but regrettably, they fail to furnish 
evidence of this. They also write that “the very adoption of 
the maternal mortality goal … is provoking greatly increased 
attention to improvements in data collection” [1]. What they 
fail to mention is that the UN adopted that goal in 1990, and 
despite 15 years of provoking increased attention, elsewhere 
the UN Millennium Project team have called the data 
“unreliable” [5].
I could dispute other unsupported assertions in the 
reply of the UN Millennium Project team, but choose not 
to do so because it would distract from this fundamental 
point: whether to honor the health of the world’s poorest 
or sickest people or to restore the earth’s most vulnerable 
natural environments or to secure human rights for children 
and women, the UN must demonstrate much greater 
responsibility than it has in measuring the status of the MDGs. 
The UN Millennium Project team urges to “cement the 
MDGs as operational rather than simply rhetorical targets” 
[1]. I agree this is desirable, and, actually, to place rhetoric 
ahead of evidence is unethical.  
That is why measurement to prove—not just to speculate—
on the MDGs’ operational progress cannot continue to 
be neglected, and also why the leading intellectuals of the 
UN Millennium Project err awfully in their judgment when 
justifying the neglect to date.  
Amir Attaran
University of Ottawa
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
E-mail: Amir.Attaran@uottawa.ca
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Power, Reliability, and Heterogeneous 
Results
Ian Shrier
I want to congratulate John P. A. Ioannidis on his thought-
provoking Essay [1]. I have two comments.
In Corollary 1, he suggests that small sample sizes mean 
smaller power, and implies that larger studies with thousands 
of subjects are more likely to be true. I think it is important 
to stress that if the effect size is large (e.g., very small variance 
that is seen in physiological studies), then adequate power 
is obtained with small numbers. Furthermore, some would 
argue that exposing subjects to research risks unnecessarily 
(e.g., when fewer subjects would yield sufﬁ  cient power) is 
unethical. Since the analysis is based on power, we should 
remember that larger is not always better. 
In Corollary 4, Ioannidis argues that greater ﬂ  exibility in 
designs, deﬁ  nitions, etc. means the results are less likely to be 
true. I agree that replication of all aspects of the study is more 
likely to yield consistent results, but this does not necessarily 
mean true results. Since we don’t know a priori which 
methodological details are most appropriate (e.g., dose, 
timing, etc.), heterogeneous results from different designs is 
an important source of information and can lead to a new, 
more in-depth understanding of the subject—and sometimes 
even paradigm shifts. I agree with the accompanying Editorial 
[2] to the article that we need to distinguish between 
the validity of the data and the validity of the authors’ 
conclusions.  
Ian Shrier
McGill University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada
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The Clinical Interpretation of Research
Stephen G. Pauker
John P. A. Ioannidis emphasizes the central role of prior 
probabilities [1]. His conclusion rests on the presumed low 
probability that a hypothesis was true before the study. 
Unfortunately, his formulation relates the post-study 
probability that the study’s conclusion is true to the pre-study 
odds. The results might have been clearer had he also plotted 
the relation of odds to probability, a curvilinear relationship, 
assuming the study carried no information. Further, the 
various graphs are right-truncated at pre-study odds, R, of 
1.0 (a probability of 0.5), although his examples go as high 
as R = 2.0. A positive study must, by deﬁ  nition, increase the 
likelihood that the hypothesis is true. It might have been 
clearer had Ioannidis chosen to relate odds to odds or 
probability to probability; in both cases, a neutral study would 
produce a straight line along a 45-degree diagonal.
The pre-study to post-study relation can more simply be 
expressed using the odds-likelihood form of Bayes rule—i.e., 
the post-study odds equal the pre-study odds multiplied times 
the likelihood ratio (LR) of the study. Then, the equations for 
positive predictive value (PPV) become the simple product 
of R × LR. For a single unbiased study, LR = (1 − β)/α. When 
incorporating study bias, u, as deﬁ  ned by Ioannidis, LR = (1 − 
β[1 − u])/(α[1 − u] + u). For a typical study with α = 0.05 and 
β = 0.2 (i.e., with a power of 0.8), LR = 16. When R is less than 
1:16 (a probability of 0.0588), the post-study odds will be less 
than one—i.e., the study’s hypothesis will be more likely false 
than true.
For non-Bayesians, statistical signiﬁ  cance testing presumes 
uninformative prior probability—i.e., R = 1. Then, LR would 
merely need to exceed one for the study’s conclusions to be 
more likely true than false. At the common signiﬁ  cance levels 
(α) of 0.05 and 0.01, the requisite study powers would merely 
need to exceed 0.05 and 0.01 respectively, corresponding to 
maximum type II error rates (β) of 0.95 and 0.99. Such lax 
requirements would almost always be met for a published 
study. Hence, the common belief that the vast majority of 
studies have valid conclusions would be correct if we can 
assume that the pre-study odds are truly uninformative. 
However, as Ioannidis suggests, this is unlikely to be the case.
Two more corollaries might be added. The higher the pre-
study odds that the study’s hypothesis is true, the lower the 
requisite power (study size and effect size) required to make 
the study’s ﬁ  ndings more likely true than false. When studies 
are published, the investigator should estimate the pre-study 
odds and report the LR implied by the observed effect.
From the perspective of an epidemiologist or a statistician, 
the relevant question is whether the study’s hypothesis is 
true—i.e., is the probability of the hypothesis greater than 
0.5? For clinicians and their patients, the relevant question 
is whether a particular strategy should be followed in an 
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individual patient or a subset of similar patients. That 
decision (or recommendation to the patient) will depend 
on the pre-study likelihood of beneﬁ  t in that patient and on 
the relative magnitude of beneﬁ  ts and risks of that strategy, 
if the diagnosis in that patient is uncertain. For many such 
decisions, the “more likely true than false” criterion may not 
be the best decision rule. For serious diseases and treatments 
of only modest risk, post-study probabilities of considerably 
less than 0.5 may be sufﬁ  cient to justify treatment [2]. 
Ioannidis’s provocative Essay is a timely call for careful 
consideration of published studies. The odds-likelihood 
formulation suggested herein may be helpful in providing a 
more intuitive model. Clinicians now need to take it to the 
next step.  
Stephen Pauker
Tufts-New England Medical Center 
Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
E-mail: spauker@tufts-nemc.org
References
1.  Ioannidis JPA (2005) Why most published research ﬁ  ndings are false. PLoS 
Med 2: e124. DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124
2.  Pauker SG, Kassirer JP (1975) Therapeutic decision making: A cost-beneﬁ  t 
analysis. N Eng J Med 293: 229–234.
Citation: Pauker S (2005) The clinical interpretation of research. PLoS Med 2(11): 
e395.
Copyright: © 2005 Stephen G. Pauker. This is an open-access article distributed 
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits 
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the 
original author and source are credited.
Competing Interests: The author has declared that no competing interests exist.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020395
Truth, Probability, and Frameworks
Jonathan D. Wren
James T. Kirk: Harry lied to you, Norman. Everything Harry says is a 
lie. Remember that, Norman: Everything he says is a lie. 
Harry Mudd: Now I want you to listen to me very carefully, Norman: 
I... am... lying.
—Star Trek, the episode “I, Mudd” 
Although John P. A. Ioannidis [1] brings up several good 
points about over-reliance on formal—yet arbitrary—
statistical cutoffs and bias against the reporting of negative 
results, his claim that most published research ﬁ  ndings 
are false is somewhat paradoxical. Ironically, the truer his 
premise is, the less likely his conclusions are. He, after 
all, relies heavily on other studies to support his premise, 
so if most (i.e., greater than 50%) of his cited studies are 
themselves false (including the eight of 37 that pertain to 
his own work), then his argument is automatically on shaky 
ground. As mentioned in the PLoS Medicine Editorial [2], 
scientiﬁ  c studies don’t offer truth, per se. Even when studies 
appear in the best journals, they offer probabilistic assertions. 
Ioannidis’s statement that “the probability that a research 
ﬁ  nding is indeed true depends on the prior probability of 
it being true” [1] is really begging the question; this, after 
all, is the problem. We cannot know such probabilities a 
priori, and guessing at such probabilities and/or parameters 
(as he does in his single nucleotide polymorphism [SNP] 
association example) surely could not be less biased than 
any statistical test of signiﬁ  cance. The key problem in 
Ioannidis’s positive predictive value (PPV) formula to 
calculate the post-study probability that a relationship is true 
(PPV = [1 − β]R/[R − βR + α], where R is the ratio of true 
relationships to no relationships) is that one can postulate 
a near-inﬁ  nite number of non-relationships. Just extending 
his SNP example, why assume each SNP acts independently? 
This is not unreasonable, given that schizophrenia is clearly 
not inherited in a Mendelian pattern. So rather than 99,990 
SNPs not being associated with schizophrenia, we have 
potentially 99,990n not associated, where n is the number 
of potentially interacting SNPs. As n grows, R becomes very 
small very quickly, and PPV becomes effectively zero. Taken 
to the extreme, this would imply that all empirical studies are 
fruitless. One of the most important factors in moving toward 
the truth, which was not discussed, is ﬁ  tting discoveries into 
a framework. Optimally, if a relationship is true, it should 
have more than one implication, permitting validation from 
multiple angles. For example, an SNP causally associated 
with schizophrenia must affect something on the molecular 
level, whether genomic, transcriptional, post-transcriptional, 
translational, or post-translational. In turn, these molecules 
should interact differently with each other, with other 
molecules within the cell, within a tissue, and/or with the 
system as a whole. If Norman, the android from Star Trek 
mentioned in the beginning quote, had been equipped with 
the capacity to evaluate statements within a framework, he 
never would have short-circuited as a result of Kirk’s paradox. 
He could have entertained the possibility that either Kirk 
was lying about Harry or Harry’s statement was incomplete 
(i.e., lying about what?) Similarly, repeatedly re-examining 
any particular ﬁ  nding to resolve the true/not true paradox 
via statistical arguments alone can short-circuit our patience. 
We should instead seek to identify the framework by which 
implications of the ﬁ  nding can be tested, and I would argue 
that the more important the ﬁ  nding, the more testable 
implications it has.  
Jonathan D. Wren
University of Oklahoma
Norman, Oklahoma, United States of America
E-mail: jonathan.wren@ou.edu
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Author’s Reply
I agree with Ian Shrier [1] that, when the effect size is large, 
adequate power is obtained with small numbers, and it is 
unnecessary to aim at very large studies. However, most effect 
sizes probed with statistical testing seem to be small. I also 
agree that heterogeneity is useful and can offer valuable 
insights [2]. Sometimes heterogeneity can show us that 
there are actually two or more research questions, where 
we thought there was only one [3]. The danger is when 
heterogeneity is silenced and dismissed in favor of claiming 
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consistent results and when heterogeneity is exploited to 
show only the most spectacular results—unfortunately, this is 
not uncommon. 
As Stephen Pauker [4] also points out correctly, it is useful 
to think about what the post-study odds are that one is aiming 
for if a study eventually were to get a “positive” result. Some 
residual uncertainty is unavoidable in any research question, 
no matter how strong the evidence. We should learn to live 
with uncertainty. I also agree that often the credibility level 
is less than 50%, yet decisions still have to be made. I don’t 
see a problem implementing a very safe and very cheap 
medical intervention, even if the credibility that it is effective 
is only 20%. However, it is important to understand and 
acknowledge that this intervention has a credibility of 20%, 
while another has a credibility of 70%. I have no objection or 
preference on how exactly this will be calculated and plotted. 
Likelihood ratios are also a nice equivalent approach to 
calculate the probabilities or odds.
I agree with Jonathan D. Wren [5] that it is impossible 
to be 100% certain about the exact pre-study odds of truth 
for any research, mine included of course. However, I 
argue that we need to start thinking more seriously and 
consistently about these pre-study odds. In the single 
nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) association example, 
one might argue that 1:10,000 is not the best choice, but 
I doubt anyone would choose 1:100 [6]. Some ﬁ  elds may, 
indeed, have a pre-study odds of zero—these are the “null 
ﬁ  elds” that I discussed [7]. The differences in the range 
in pre-study odds are huge in current research, and I am 
afraid that this is almost completely ignored. I also have no 
objection about the framework concept. It is nice to see 
multiple lines of evidence converge. In fact “framework” 
evidence may be used to formulate more accurate pre-
study odds. However, we should be cautious about how this 
framework is interpreted. We need more empirical data on 
how scientists try to converge various pieces of biological, 
epidemiological, and clinical information. I suspect that bias 
to make things ﬁ  t, even if they don’t, is not negligible.  
John P. A. Ioannidis
University of Ioannina School of Medicine
Ioannina, Greece
E-mail: jioannid@cc.uoi.gr
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Did Glycopeptide Use in Animals 
Result in Hospital Infections of VRE?
Anthony Mudd
As one of the persons involved with the development of 
avoparcin for farm animals, I have followed the discussion 
on vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) and its potential 
transfer from animals to humans over the past decade. What 
a pity that the authors of this PLoS Medicine Policy Forum 
[1] did not reference a recent review by Wassenaar [2] that 
comprehensively discussed this topic. In this review, evidence 
is presented to show that VRE infections in humans have 
actually increased in the European Union since avoparcin 
was removed from the market. Other data show that whole-
genome typing methods separate clinical VRE strains from 
animal or nonhospitalized human strains. 
The conclusion of the Smith et al. article [1] that a correct 
decision was made to adopt the EU “precautionary principle” 
and remove avoparcin from the market is surprising, as this 
is contrary to the opinion of the independent EU Scientiﬁ  c 
Committee for Animal Nutrition, and since a quantitative 
risk analysis, as suggested by the authors, could not conclude 
a relationship between glycopeptide use in animals and 
incidence of clinical infection in humans.  
Anthony Mudd
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The Need of a Neonatal Preparation for 
Chagas Disease
Sergio Sosa-Estani, Jose M. Belizan, Fernando Althabe, 
Aldofo Rubinstein
We have read about the efforts and initiatives related to the 
design of drugs for parasitic diseases in McKerrow’s article 
[1] with interest and expectation. One of the pressing needs 
in this area is for a neonatal preparation for Chagas disease. 
Satisfactory achievements have been made in Argentina 
in relation to the transmission of the disease by vectors and 
through blood transfusion [2,3]. Vertical transmission is now 
the great challenge in eradicating Chagas disease. Around 
800–1,300 neonates infected with Trypanosmoma cruzi are born 
every year in our country [4]. Almost 99% of all births occur 
in hospital, thus allowing the detection of infants born with 
parasites immediately after birth. The initiation of treatment 
of these neonates before they and their mothers leave the 
hospital is a good strategy to obtain high treatment coverage. 
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The later attendance of mothers with their children to health-
care facilities is quite unpredictable and irregular. Also, it 
is difﬁ  cult to link information about maternal and neonatal 
parasitic status obtained at birth with later attendance at 
other health-care facilities.
It would, therefore, be of great value to have a neonatal 
preparation for the treatment of Chagas disease. There is 
currently no neonatal or infant preparation available. Instead, 
one of the two available adult preparations (nifurtimox or 
benznidazol) is mashed and diluted at local level in order 
to be administered to newborns and infants. It is easy to 
understand the difﬁ  culties and uncertainties that these 
procedures involve. 
We hope that in the agenda of the several initiatives 
mentioned in this article [1] the development of a neonatal 
preparation for Chagas disease could be considered. It would 
beneﬁ  t many infants every year.  
Sergio Sosa-Estani (ssosa@msal.gov.ar)
Jose M. Belizan 
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Placebo: Physician, Heal Thyself 
Arunachalam Kumar, C. Jairaj Kumar
Kudos to Miller et al. [1] for exposing the seamy side of 
medical research. No matter how positive the results of drug 
effectiveness, as demonstrated through against-placebo 
comparison studies, the fact remains that the ends do not 
justify the means. 
To knowingly and willingly induce a patient to trust in the 
pharmacotherapeutic effectiveness of a phony drug not only 
trivializes the patient’s intelligence, but also devalues the 
mentor status of the treating physician. 
The role of placebo therapy, though quite dramatic at 
times, does not sanctify the manner in which large-scale 
research studies pit one group of falsely guided patients or 
volunteers against another. The medical and pharmacological 
world must relegate blind new drug–placebo comparison 
studies to the back burner. Medical journals, too, have a 
major role in publishing papers that contain misinformation 
and that mislead. The psychosomatic pharmacokinetics of 
drugs can be tested or evaluated through much less dubious 
means than placebo-based research. 
The medical profession has an onus to constantly and 
continuously present itself as an educated partner of the 
patient in the treatment of disease and ill health: we are quite 
positive that not a single volunteer would agree to participate 
in any placebo–new drug study, if informed of the patently 
false and fake nature of the research protocols.
There is no denying the fact that placebo therapy has a role 
in ﬁ  ghting disease, but too much nearly criminal injustice is 
perpetuated in the form of misinformation in placebo-based 
research studies. The sooner medical professionals and drug 
manufacturers proscribe placebo-based research, the better 
for all. 
We congratulate the authors of this Policy Forum [1] for 
bringing to light this rather dark side of research, and hope 
that the debate engendered will result in re-establishing the 
physician as a trusted conﬁ  dant of the trusting patient.  
Arunachalam Kumar (ixedoc@sulekha.com)
C. Jairaj Kumar 
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Mental Health Care and Mental Health 
Legislation in Pakistan: No Mercy for 
Losers 
Haider Ali Naqvi
In the Policy Forum by Gilani et al. [1], the authors have 
quite vividly described the state of mental health care and 
legislation in Pakistan. Indeed, the situation is one of low 
awareness and resources, much like other low-income 
countries in Southeast Asia. Even at the international level, 
there is deep-seated societal ambivalence toward the mentally 
ill. The so-called human rights principles have little material 
effect on the lives of psychiatric patients, and create double 
standards in the exercise of choice [2].
The promulgation of the new mental health ordinance 
has, indeed, been a red-letter day in the history of Pakistani 
legislation. However, how this document translates into real 
world action remains to be seen. In Pakistan, 70% of health-
care services are provided by the private sector, and this, 
too, is mostly curative in nature [3]. According to the World 
Health Report (2004), 100% of health-care payments are an 
out-of-pocket expense for Pakistanis. Most private health care 
is unregulated. No hospital in Pakistan has Joint Commission 
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on Accreditation on Healthcare Organization (JCAHO) 
accreditation. Anecdotal reports on abuse of individuals who 
are mentally ill are ubiquitous. It is not uncommon to see 
patients who are mentally ill chained to their beds. There is 
poor provision of psychotropic medication in government-
run hospitals. Contrarily, one sees a cocktail of ﬁ  ve 
medications prescribed by an inadequately trained mental 
health professional in private practice. Out of 342 registered 
psychiatrists, hardly 100–150 have adequate training. The 
Pakistan Medical and Dental Council is the sole body for 
the proper licensing and credentialing of physicians. The 
problem lies in the implementation of rules and regulations, 
rather than their existence. One sees a chain of psychiatric 
hospitals, claiming to deliver psychiatric care, with no 
qualiﬁ  ed psychiatrists on their panels. There is no legal action 
taken against these people who blatantly exploit patients with 
mental illness. 
All the major tertiary care centers in Pakistan have allied 
general medical and anesthesia services, yet the provision 
of modiﬁ  ed electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) is deemed 
only “preferable” in the new mental health ordinance. 
Unmodiﬁ  ed use of ECT results in serious and potentially 
life-threatening complications. Similarly, there are other 
paradoxes in the actual care and legislative protection of 
people with mental illness. The Federal Authority for Mental 
Health has played no active role in addressing these glaring 
inequities since its organization in 2001. Contrarily, there is a 
risk that it might become a power broker for bureaucracy and 
ministry ofﬁ  cials, rather than serving the real stakeholders. 
Essentially, nothing has changed for people with mental 
illness, except the nomenclature and terminologies. There is 
still no mercy for people with mental illness in poor and other 
marginalized communities. 
Governmental low health-care spending (less than 1% of 
gross national product) should be seen in the context of the 
bigger geopolitical situation. Countries’ major spending is 
on defense and military armaments. This is in a politically 
volatile environment, with ongoing border conﬂ  icts with 
neighbors. However, there is a need for strong political will 
from the government, which oversees the implementation of 
rules and regulations and protects the rights of people with 
mental illness. 
For a comprehensive solution, an active public–private 
partnership is required. This requires a uniﬁ  ed agenda and 
commitment from both sectors. Any lasting solution has to 
address the deep-rooted inequities, ethical misconduct, and 
micro- and macroeconomic issues.  
Haider Ali Naqvi 
Aga Khan University Hospital 
Karachi, Pakistan
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Genetic Research on Nicotine 
Dependence Will Facilitate Public 
Health
Joe Cubells
W. D. Hall’s cogent Research in Translation article [1] on the 
folly of attempting to use predictive genetic testing in public-
health measures to prevent nicotine dependence is a valuable 
contribution. Indeed, his arguments against predictive 
testing can easily be applied to virtually any complex genetic 
disorder. It is certainly important that we in the medical 
research community continue to offer such articulate 
education to clinicians, the press, and society in general.
There is a danger, however, that his arguments will be 
seized by those who oppose supporting research on the 
genetics of nicotine dependence and other addictions, to 
the detriment of public health. For example, Merikangas 
and Risch [2] have already proposed that addictions and 
several other complex diseases should be deprived of federal 
research support in favor of other complex disorders, 
arguing, “The expensive and laborious tools of molecular 
genetics [should] be prioritized to those diseases ... that 
cannot now be treated or prevented with environmental 
changes [such as] type 1 diabetes, multiple sclerosis, autism 
and schizophrenia. In contrast, gene hunting for disorders 
that appear to be highly amenable to environmental 
modiﬁ  cation, such as type 2 diabetes, AIDS, alcohol 
dependence and nicotine dependence, would have lower 
priority [for federal research support], even though genes 
may be involved in their etiology.” Those arguments were 
picked up by right-wing commentators and trumpeted in 
high-proﬁ  le lay outlets such as the New York Times. For 
example, Humphreys and Satel [3] (the latter a resident 
scholar at the American Enterprise Institute) cite Merikangas 
and Risch when they conclude, “Some gene research just 
isn’t worth the money ... [because] major cuts in drug- and 
alcohol-related harm depend not on genes but on choices 
by policy makers and individual citizens.” Thus, the myth 
that addictive behavior is simply a matter of “choice” is made 
to appear as if it has solid science behind it, when in my 
view, the only real rationale for opposing genetic research 
on disorders related to smoking, drinking, overeating, 
homosexual sex, and other “sinful” behavior derives from the 
same strain of religious moralism underlying creationism and 
intelligent design. 
Such arguments miss the most important rationale for 
genetic research on addictions and other environmentally 
inﬂ  uenced complex disorders. These conditions deserve 
continued vigorous support from the National Institutes 
of Health and other sources because genetic research is 
a powerful tool for pointing us toward new treatments 
based on improved understanding of the biology of the 
disorders. Nicotine dependence is an important case in point 
because current treatments, which consist of psychosocial 
interventions, and medication therapies such as nicotine 
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replacement and buproprion are, in a word, ineffective: 
relapse rates following smoking cessation with those 
strategies, while slightly better than no intervention, usually 
exceed 80% at one-year follow-up [4].
Genetic research, by providing suggestive evidence for 
associations to the genes encoding the gamma-amino 
butyric acid (GABA) B receptor subunit 2 [5], or the 
cannabinoid-1 receptor [6,7], has already helped light the 
way toward potentially more effective interventions for 
millions who struggle to quit smoking, but repeatedly fail. 
While predictive testing of risk for nicotine dependence 
based on those genetic ﬁ  ndings is quite useless, it 
remains to be ascertained whether pharmacogenetic 
proﬁ  ling will be useful for identifying those most likely 
to beneﬁ  t from speciﬁ  c medications (or for that matter, 
psychosocial interventions), or who would be at risk for 
harmful side-effects from an otherwise effective drug. 
While the potential for such proﬁ  ling has been hyped up 
in the popular press just as predictive testing has been, we 
have only to recall the lives saved by understanding the 
genetic basis of variation in thiopurine methyltransferase 
activity, in the context of thiopurine chemotherapy for 
acute lymphoblastic leukemia [8], to convince ourselves 
of the importance of studying the genetic basis of all 
common complex diseases, whether partially amenable to 
environmental prevention or not.  
Joe Cubells
Emory University School of Medicine
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